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however, do not apply in the absence of a professional relation-
ship. 18 Moreover, in a case such as Colpan, wherein the insurer
denied responsibility for the conduct of the litigation from the
outset, the concept of reliance upon a continuing course of rep-
resentation is misplaced. 19 No injustice is done by requiring that
the insured assert his claim within 6 years of the purported breach.
It is submitted, therefore, that the Colpan court's application of
the continuous treatment doctrine to an insurance company's cov-
enant to defend is an erroneous extension of the doctrine. The
decision burdens insurers with substantially extended potential lia-
bility, and yet is not supported by the policy considerations which
justify application of the doctrine of continuous treatment in mal-
practice actions.
CPLR 203(c): Tolling provisions for defenses and counterclaims extended
to cross-claims.
CPLR 203(c) permits the interposition of a defense or coun-
terclaim even though such defense or counterclaim would be
barred by the applicable statute of limitations were it to be prose-
cuted as an independent cause of action. 20 This provision codifies
the doctrine of relation back, whereby any time-barred defense or
counterclaim is maintainable so long as it is not time barred when
the plaintiff commences his cause of action. 21 Moreover, even if the
18 See note 17 supra. One recent case has extended the continuous treatment exception
to actions in contract against an attorney. Grago v. Robertson, 49 App. Div. 2d 645, 370
N.Y.S.2d 255 (3d Dep't 1975) (mem.) (cause of action accrued at termination of representa-
tion in action for breach of contractual obligation to preserve legal interests). Since the
justification for the doctrine is based upon the nature of the professional relationship, it is
appropriate to apply it to all wrongs committed within the framework of that relationship,
whether the allegations sound in tort or contract.
19 See note 13 supra.
20 CPLR 203(c) provides:
A defense or counterclaim is interposed when a pleading containing it is served. A
defense or counterclaim is not barred if it was not barred at the time the claims
asserted in the complaint were interposed, except that if the defense or coun-
terclaim arose from the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or oc-
currences, upon which a claim asserted in the complaint depends, it is not barred to
the extent of the demand in the complaint notwithstanding that it was barred at the
time the claims asserted in the complaint were interposed.
21 Under the CPA, the statute of limitations on a counterclaim continued to run until
service of the answer containing the counterclaim. See CPA § 11. Plaintiffs who feared
counterclaims based on the same occurrence were encouraged to delay commencement of a
lawsuit until it would be difficult or impossible for the defendant to timely interpose his
counterclaim. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 203(c), commentary at 119 (1972). The doctrine of
relation back, as codified in the CPLR, has been readily accepted and applied by the courts.
See, e.g., Styles v. Gibson, 27 App. Div. 2d 784, 277 N.Y.S.2d 245 (3d Dep't 1967); Ornter v.
Booth, 21 App. Div. 2d 663, 249 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1st Dep't 1964); Star Credit Corp. v. Ingram,
170 N.Y.L.J. 1, July 2, 1973, at 2, col. 1 (App. T. 1st Dep't).
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counterclaim or defense is time barred when the action is com-
menced, it may be asserted if "the defense or counterclaim arose
from the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or
occurrences, upon which a claim asserted in the complaint de-
pends. ' 22 This second part of the statute is a codification of the
doctrine of equitable recoupment, 23 and a defense or counterclaim
protected by it may be used only as a setoff.24 Although CPLR
203(c) speaks specifically of defenses or counterclaims, the Appel-
late Division, First Department, in Seligson v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 25 extended the tolling provision to include the assertion of
cross-claims between codefendants.
The plaintiff in Seligson was the trustee for the bankrupt
partnership of Ira Haupt & Co. Plaintiff commenced an action
against Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase), seeking to have Chase
recredit Haupt's account for two checks that were paid over a
forged endorsement (the Haupt checks).2 6 Chase then brought an
action predicated on guaranty of endorsement and warranty of
good tite against both the depository bank, Central Bank (Central),
and its intermediary bank, Chemical Bank (Chemical).27 The forg-
er, Joseph Gil, had used the two checks to open an account at
Central. Shortly thereafter, when he attempted to withdraw the
funds in cash,28 Central refused to honor his request, and instead
permitted him to withdraw the money in the form of two checks
(the Gil checks) drawn on the Central account for the same amount
as the Haupt checks and payable to the same parties.29 Gil again
22 CPLR 203(c).
23 While the doctrine of equitable recoupment was available under the CPA, its use was
confined to contract cases. For instance, a defendant who was sued on breach of contract
could interpose the plaintiff's breach of contract but not a claim based in tort. See, e.g.,
Hammill v. Curtis, 18 App. Div. 2d 749, 235 N.Y.S.2d 831 (3d Dep't 1962) (mem.); Title
Guar. & Trust Co. v. Hicks, 283 App. Div. 723, 127 N.Y.S.2d 340 (2d Dep't 1959) (mem.).
See also 1 WK&M 203.25; 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 203(c), commentary at 119 (1972). CPLR
203(c) removed the restriction that recoupment may be had only in contract actions; it
provides that recoupment relief is available so long as the defendant's claim arises from the
transaction(s) upon which the plaintiff's claim is based. See, e.g., Headley v. Noto, 22 N.Y.2d
1, 237 N.E.2d 871, 290 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1968); Chevron Oil Co. v. Atlas Oil Co., 28 App. Div.
2d 644, 280 N.Y.S.2d 731 (4th Dep't 1967) (mem.). It has been suggested that this new
proviso should itself be liberally applied. 1 WK&M 203.25.
24 CPLR 203(c). See, e.g., Headley v. Noto, 22 N.Y.2d 1, 237 N.E.2d 871, 290 N.Y.S.2d
726 (1968); First Nat'l City Bank v. Drake, 170 N.Y.L.J. 62, Sept. 27, 1973, at 17, col. 6
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County).
25 50 App. Div. 2d 206, 376 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1st Dep't 1975).
26Id. at 207, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 901.27 Id. at 208, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 902. See also Brief for Appellant at 6-7, Seligson v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 50 App. Div. 2d 207, 376 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1st Dep't 1975).28 The time span between opening the account at Central and the subsequent closing of
the same was only 6 days. Brief for Appellant at 5.
29 The court surmised that Central believed the whole transaction to be of a dubious
nature. 50 App. Div. 2d at 207, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
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forged the payees' signatures and, coincidentally, used the Gil
checks to open a new account at Chemical. Central then honored
the Gil checks upon presentation for payment by Chemical. 30
The Chase and Seligson actions were commenced by service of
summons on November 1, 1968 and November 5, 1968, respec-
tively.3I Both actions, timely commenced within the applicable stat-
ute of limitations, 32 were permitted to lay dormant for some 4
years. 3 The Seligson complaint was served on Chase on March 30,
1972. Central received the Chase complaint on August 28, 1972
and Chemical was served by Chase on November 5, 1973. When
the defendants in the Chase action served their answers, Central on
January 5, 1973 and Chemical on December 11, 1973, each plead-
ing contained a cross-claim. Chemical's cross-claim was based on its
reliance upon Central's guaranty of the endorsements and war-
ranty of good title to the Haupt checks, while Central's cross-claim
asserted that Chemical was similarly liable on the Gil checks. Addi-
tionally, Central claimed it was entitled to recoup from Chemical if
Chase recovered judgment against Central. Chemical successful-
ly moved in special term to dismiss Central's cross-claim as time
barred.
On appeal, the First Department affirmed.3 4 Declaring that the
only distinction between a counterclaim and a cross-claim is the
party alleged to be liable,35 the court reasoned that the failure to
30 Id., 376 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
31 CPLR 203(b) provides that for the purpose of determining whether a claim is timely,
a claim in a complaint is interposed when service of summons is made on the defendant.
The statute of limitations, therefore, runs from the accrual of the cause of action, CPLR
203(a), to the date of service of summons.
32 The first action had a 6-year statute of limitations since it was based upon a contrac-
tual obligation between Ira Haupt & Co. and Chase. See CPLR 213(2). Similarly, the second
action, based on guaranty of endorsement and warranty of good title, was also governed by a
6-year period of limitations. See id. The cause of action, in both cases, accrues from the time
when the right to make the demand was completed, i.e., when the checks were cashed. See
Homer Eng'r Co. v. New York, 12 N.Y.2d 508, 191 N.E.2d 455, 240 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1963).
Had Seligson been decided under the Uniform Commercial Code, the cause of action would
have accrued from the notice of honor. N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-122 (McKinney 1964). Since the
cause of action accrued prior to the adoption of the Code, it was governed by pre-Code case
law.
33 The service of further pleadings, after the service of summons, was deferred upon an
agreement between the attorneys for all parties while Seligson attempted to recover the
money from a third party. After Seligson's attempts failed, the complaints were then served.
Brief for Appellant at 17.
34 Special Term had granted Chemical's motion on the ground that although Central's
cross-claim was within the purview of CPLR 203(c), the section did not protect the cross-
claim since Central's claim was based on the Gil checks. Although affirming the result in the
supreme court, the appellate division found this rationale invalid because the lower court
applied the same-transaction or series-of-transactions requirement to the doctrine of relation
back, as well as to equitable recoupment. 50 App. Div. 2d at 208-09, 376 N.Y.S.2d at
902-03.
35 Id. at 209, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 903. Compare CPLR 3019(a), with CtLR 3019(b). See also H.
WACHTELL, NEw YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 134-40 (4th ed. 1973).
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include cross-claims within section 203(c) was merely a "legislative
oversight. ' 36 Accordingly, the Seligson court had no difficulty in
extending the ambit of the section to include cross-claims.3 7 Inter-
preting the court's language literally, the doctrine of relation back
would have preserved Central's cross-claim since the 6-year statute
of limitations on Central's action had not yet run when Chase
commenced the original action. The court then held, however, that
the Central cross-claim was not saved by the statute because it was
based on the Gil checks and was thus unrelated to the claims of
Chemical and Chase on the Haupt checks. 38 The court had previ-
ously noted that the equitable recoupment provision of section
203(c) is needed only where the counterclaim or defense is not
preserved by the doctrine of relation back, since it was time barred
at the time of the interposition of the complaint.3 9 Thus, for the
Seligson court to have used the recoupment provision, it must first
have decided sub silentio that Central's claim was time barred at the
interposition of the "complaint." Clearly, the Central claim was not
time barred at the commencement of the main action. Although
the court did not explicitly state which pleading was to be consid-
ered the "complaint" against which the cross-claim was interposed
as a "defense," it implicitly selected the time of filing of the Chemi-
cal cross-claim against Central as the applicable date. 40 In effect,
the court viewed the crossing cross-claims as constituting an en-
tirely separate action. Chemical's cross-claim against Central for
indemnity4' served as the "complaint" which must be looked to in
determining whether the relation back provision of CPLR 203(c) is
applicable.42 Since the Central claim was time barred as of the date
the Chemical cross-claim was interposed,4 3 the doctrine of relation
36 50 App. Div. 2d at 210, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 904.3 7 Id. This judicial extension of CPLR 203(c) was predicated upon CPLR 3019(d), which
states that "[a] cause of action contained in a counterclaim or a cross-claim shall be treated, as
far as practicable, as if it were contained in the complaint .... " For a discussion on the
requirements of pleading and trying a counterclaim or a cross-claim, see 7B McKINNEY'S
CPLR 3019(d), commentary at 228-30 (1974).
31 50 App. Div. 2d at 210, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 904. If the Central cross-claim were related to
the Chase action, it would not have been time barred. Since the cause of action on the Gil
checks accrued, at the earliest possible date, on November 18, 1962, Brief for Appellant at
6-7, the period of limitations on Central's claim would have run until the end of November
1968. Chase commenced the action against Central with service of summons on November 1,
1968. Thus, when the action was commenced, time had not expired on any cause of action
Central may have had against Chase.
39Id. at 209-10, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
'Id. at 210, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
41 See note 45 infra.
42 CPLR 3019(d), discussed in note 37 supra, lends some credence to the court's reason-
ing.
.3 Since Chemical asserted its indemnity claim on December 11, 1973, and since Cen-
tral's cause of action accrued on November 18, 1962, the statute of limitations applicable to
Centrars claim had expired approximately 5 years prior to service of Chemical's cross-claim.
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back was inapplicable. The court then looked to the recoupment
provision of the section and similarly found it to be inapplicable
since the claim on the Gil checks was "unrelated to the claims of
Chase and Chemical on the Haupt checks." 4
Although the application of CPLR 203(c) to cross-claims may
have led to an equitable result in Seligson, it is submitted that the
court could have easily protected the intermediary bank, Chemical,
in a simpler manner. Since the court held that Chemical's cross-
claim was grounded in indemnity, 45 it could have avoided its radi-
cal modification of section 203(c) by stating that the indemnity
statute of limitations had not yet run, and thus Chemical's claim
was timely, while Central's cross-claim was based on breach of
warranty, and was thus time barred.46
The problematic decision to include cross-claims within 203(c)
should have been purely a legislative decision. The legislature,
unlike the courts, is designed to investigate and debate the sound-
ness of such an extension. The court looked only to the case before
it, and could not thoroughly consider the procedural and substan-
tive ramifications of the decision. 47 The Seligson court's unsup-
14 50 App. Div. 2d at 210, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 904. Without much discussion, the court was
ready to dismiss Central's claim on the Gil checks as not within the same transaction or series
of transactions upon which Chemical's claim was based. In fact, the court noted that
happenstance was the only factor which provided any connection between the two separate
transactions. As the court itself stated, "Central's claim on the Gil checks ... is unrelated to
the claims of Chase and Chemical on the Haupt check. Indeed, the point is underscored by
the sheer fortuity of circumstances which led Gil to deposit the second checks in a branch of
Chemical." Id. It is submitted, however, that the Central's claim actually arose from the same
series of transactions as did the claims on the Haupt checks. There are several reasons why
the two should be deemed part of the same series of transactions: (1) the Haupt checks gave
rise to the Gil checks; (2) Chase's and Central's claims are both essentially based upon
forgery by Gil; (3) the theories of recovery asserted by the banks are the same; (4) both sets of
checks were in the same amount and payable to the same individuals; (5) the time between
the two events was only 6 days. Brief for Appellant at 12-13. If the same-transaction
requirement is to be broadly construed, see note 23 supra, there is no reason why the claims
of Chase, Chemical, and Central should be deemed unrelated.
" Although the court initially stated that Chemical's cross-claim was based on the
warranty of prior endorsement, it was implicitly assumed throughout the opinion that
Chemical's claim was one of indemnification. The applicable statute of limitations for indem-
nity is 6 years. CPLR 213(1). It does not begin to run until liability first arises against the
indemnitee. See, e.g., Corbetta Constr. Co. v. George F. Driscoll Co., 17 App. Div. 2d 176,
180, 233 N.Y.S.2d 225, 229 (Ist Dep't 1962); Griffin v. Caldwell, 37 Misc. 2d 941, 942, 235
N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1962); Antonelli v. City of Mount Vernon, 20
Misc. 2d 331, 189 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1959). Thus, the statute of
limitations could not begin to run against Chemical's claim for indemnification until judg-
ment was rendered against it. An indemnification claim, however, may be pleaded prior to
actual accrual of the right. See CPLR 3019(b); Bides v. Abraham & Strauss Div. of Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc., 33 App. Div. 2d 569, 305 N.Y.S.2d 336 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.).
4" Had the court treated Central's cross-claim as an independent cause of action, the
statute of limitations would have expired 6 years from November 18, 1962. See note 43 supra.
47 The extension of CPLR 203(c) to cross-claims poses many other unanswered ques-
tions. Must the first cross-claim be a viable cause of action, not yet time barred when it is
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ported statement that the absence of cross-claims from the lan-
guage of CPLR 203(c) was a result of "legislative oversight,"48 is
weak support for such a significant modification of the statute.
Moreover, rather than avoiding a multiplicity of suits, the exten-
sion of CPLR 203(c) actually will increase the burden on the court
system by permitting a new class of time-barred claims to be re-
vived in extended trials.
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE
AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(b): Matrimonial domicile basis ofjurisdiction strictly construed.
CPLR 302(b) allows a court, in certain circumstances, to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident or nondomiciliary
defendant in an action brought by a New York domiciliary or
resident seeking support or alimony. 49 One situation in which the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is permitted by the statute is where
New York was "the matrimonial domicile of the parties before their
asserted? What if the first cross-claim is time barred, and yet relates to the events under
consideration in the main action? Although Seligson involves a major change in New York
procedural law, the court apparently gave no consideration to these and similar problems.
48 50 App. Div. 2d at 210, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
49 CPLR 302(b) provides:
A court in any matrimonial action or family court proceeding involving a demand
for support or alimony may exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondent or
defendant notwithstanding the fact that he or she is no longer a resident or
domiciliary of this state, or over his or her executor or administrator, if the party
seeking support is a resident of or domiciled in this state at the time such demand is
made, provided that this state was the matrimonial domicile of the parties before
their separation, or the defendant abandoned the plaintiff in this state, or the
obligation to pay support or alimony or alimony [sic] accrued under the laws of this
state or under an agreement executed in this state.
The statute was enacted by the legislature in 1974. Ch. 859, § 1, [1974] N.Y. Laws 1339
(McKinney). Such an amendment to New York's long-arm statute became increasingly
necessary as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.
287 (1942), wherein the Court held that an ex parte divorce is entitled to full faith and credit
if one spouse is domiciled in the divorce forum. Williams thus enabled one spouse to
abandon the other by moving out of state, establish domicile in a state with liberal divorce
laws in order to obtain an ex parte divorce, while at the same time remaining immune from
any claim for support, such demand being considered an action in personam requiring
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. See Renaudin v. Renaudin, 37 App.
Div. 2d 183, 323 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1st Dep't 1971). In most cases, attempts to acquire personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant-spouses by use of the traditional long-arm statute,
CPLR 302(a), have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Whitaker, 32 App. Div. 2d 595,
299 N.Y.S.2d 482 (3d Dep't 1969); Kochenthal v. Kochenthal, 28 App. Div. 2d 117, 282
N.Y.S.2d 36 (2d Dep't 1967); Baum v. Baum, 62 Misc. 2d 305, 307 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1970); Inkelas v. Inkelas, 58 Misc. 2d 340, 295 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1968). New York has enacted the Uniform Support of Dependents Law, DRL §§ 30
el seq., under which a New York petitioner may bring a proceeding to compel support from a
respondent residing in a state having substantially similar or reciprocal laws. The Uniform
Law, however, is inapplicable to ex-spouses.
